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Administrative Reform and the Rationalisation
of Specific Purpose Grants*
Kiyohito Hanai
The role of specificpurpose grants (Kokko Shishutsukin) in Japanese
public finance increased in importance throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
The increase in the amount of specificpurpose grants and correspond-
ing expansion in the size of the public sector created management
difficultiesfor both national and local public finance. This paper
examines attempts to halt the growth of specific purpose grants,
especiallythrough administrative reform in the 1980s. I explore the
impact of administrative reform on the rationalisationof specific
purpose grants and the participationof local bodies implementing the
program of public sector reform.
Administrative reform in the postwar period
Administrative reform has been proposed regularly throughout the
postwar period, as the central government grappled with the ongoing
problem of managing a burgeoning public sector and restructuringits
inelasticfinancialrelationshipswith local governments. Of the many
attempts at administrative reform aimed at curtailingpublic expendi-
ture and limiting personnel growth, most had only limited success. It
was not until the early 1980s that administrative reform successfully
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tackled the issues of reorganisationof the public sector, improvement
of administrative efficiency,rationalisationof specific purpose grants
and decentralisationof central-localrelationships.
The administrative reform of the early 1980s was effective in
tackling financialissues faced by both the central and local govern-
ments at the time; it was particularlysuccessful in reducing the fiscal
deficitsof the central government and in halting spirallingexpenditure
on specificpurpose grants. However, the reform stillfailedto address
underlying weaknesses in the relationshipbetween the centraland local
governments: excessive centralisationof administrative functions, and
lack of local government autonomy. Instead, the central government
has been dealing with these issues on an ad hoc basis,through one-off
block grants to strengthen local government autonomy over financial
decision-making, for example.
Table 1 summarises the chronology of administrative reform in
the postwar period. Three major reforms, the Shoup Mission, the
Commission for Rationalising Specific Purpose Grants in the First
Administrative Reform, and the Second Provisional Commission for
Administrative Reform, had a large impact on the role of specific
purpose grants and also on intergovernmental financialrelationships.
The aims of these reforms have been described by Kato and Hyodo
(1988) and are discussed brieflybelow.
The Shoup Mission was set up by the Allied Occupation
Administration in 1949 to installa new fiscalsystem in postwar Japan.
Its aim was to establish a democratic and decentralisedintergovern-
mental financialstructure in preparation for independence. The Shoup
Mission presented a set of recommendations covering tax reform as
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Table 1 Chronology of major postwar administrative reforms proposing
rationalisationof specificpurpose grants
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well as reorganisation of the intergovernmental financial system.
The Mission advocated far-reaching reform of specific purpose
grants, which had become the main tool for controlling local public
finance in the prewar centralised fiscal system. The main proposals put
forward in the Mission's recommendation were: a drastic shift in the
pattern of intergovernmental grants from specific purpose grants to
equalisation grants {Heiko Kofukin), the function of which was to be
closer to general revenue grants (the function of specific purpose
grants, meanwhile, to be limited to national treasury grants-in-aid);
abolition of the central government's obligatory share in order to clarify
the responsibilities of administrative organisations and achieve the
appropriate engagement of central and local public administrations; and
establishment of a fundamental plan for the healthy administration and
allocation of finances by central and local governments on the basis of
a decentralised fiscal system.
The reform trimmed specific purpose grants and strengthened
local government control over its own funding in the form of local
taxes and equalisation grants. However, the revenue thus obtained was
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not sufficientforlocal governments to meet the increasing expense of
administrative activitiesduring the period of economic recovery and
growth in the 1950s. Local governments increased deficits and
borrowing but eventually came to rely on specificpurpose grants from
the centralgovernment. The resurgence of specificpurpose grants was
formalised in the Law on Special Measures to Promote the Recon-
struction of Local Public Finance in 1955 (Local Autonomy College
1990).
The Commission for RationalisingSpecificPurpose Grants was set
up in 1963 as part of the First ProvisionalCommission for Administra-
tive Reform. The commission was constituted to consider the financial
and administrative relationship of the central government and local
governments through an examination of the tax system and of patterns
of specificpurpose grants during the period of high economic growth.
The commission's views on rationalisingspecificpurpose grants were
as follows:
Careful consideration was given to tax-sharing and fiscal
equalisationamong governments. The commission basically proposed
that unnecessary specificpurpose grants should be abolished.It also
recommended the maintenance of some specific purpose grants that
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would be acceptable from the viewpoint of demonstrating a balanced
financial commitment between the central government and local
governments. The commission was in favour of providing financial
support to local governments in such areas as: obligatory works carried
out by local governments, the content and costs of which were
prescribed in detail by law; new projects of local governments that the
central government particularly wanted to encourage; works by
financially disadvantaged local governments; and works having a
temporary need for additional financing.
The reform, however, was not carried out. This was because the
commission failed to consider the feasibilityof the reform in its public
choice process. The commission's attempt to promote the reform
through a strong top management system (reinforcing the functions of
Cabinet, central ministries and agencies) was in conflict with traditional
Japanese methods of management and administration (Kumon 1984). As
a result, the reform failed to gain the support and cooperation of the
administrative divisions, both at the central and local government
levels, that would be responsible for implementing it.
In the early 1980s, the Second Provisional Commission for
Administrative Reform proposed drastic reforms aimed at improving the
efficiency of the public sector and rationalising specific purpose grants.
The need for the establishment of this second commission became
apparent in the late 1970s, a time of fiscal crisisin the public sector.
Learning from the experience of previous attempts at administra-
tive reform, the commission tackled the reform of public finance and
administration in a broadly based way, recommending a rationalisation
of specific purpose grants, financial cuts affecting both central and
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local governments and the privatisation of public corporations.
Cooperation in promoting administrative reform was obtained from
both the private sector and the public sector itself.In the wake of the
second oil shock, the private sector was in favour of budgetary
tightening. According to Noguchi (1991), this was partly because
business leaders were dissatisfied with the results of the expansionary
policy of 1977-78 and partly because they were concerned about future
tax increases which would be directed at corporate income. There was
also a strong push for reform from the public sector. In particular, the
Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Management Agency
looked on the reform as a way of overcoming the central government's
financial difficulties without increasing taxes. These two ministries took
the lead in promoting efficiency in fiscal management and reforming
government organisations. The reform also had strong governmental
support and was under the personal leadership of Prime Ministers
Suzuki and Nakasone."
Administrative reform in the 1980s
Japan experienced a fiscal crisis in the late 1970s the magnitude of
which was reflected in a huge and accumulating national debt. This
fiscal crisis brought about an increased desire among the Japanese
people for structural reform of public finance at both national and local
levels.
The seriousness of the fiscal crisisis confirmed statisticallyby data
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on fiscal deficitsin the public sector. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the deficit hovered at around 4 percent of GNP. In the late 1970s, the
central government compensated for fiscal deficits by issuing
government bonds; this practice continued right up until 1990. Central
government bond issues were worth a total of 100 trillionyen in 1983
(170 trillionyen in 1991).
Yamamoto (1988) has examined Japan's heavy reliance on financing
through government debt compared with other countries (Table 2).
The first column of Table 2 shows long-term government bond
financing as a percentage of the public sector's total fiscal revenue.
Table 2 Dependence on government bonds in Japanese public finance
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Japan recorded a figure of 19.4 percent, far higher than the 4 to 12
percent recorded by comparable OECD countries. The second column
shows interest payments on government bonds as a percentage of
public expenditure. Japan's interest payments reached 20 percent,
compared with 7 to 14 percent for other OECD countries. The third
column shows accumulation of long-term government bonds as a
percentage of GNP. Once again Japan has the highest rate (51.6
percent). These figures indicate that the Japanese fiscal system had
structural inefficiencies incorporated into it, resulting in a large public
sector and public sector deficit.
There are several explanations for the fiscal crisis (Noguchi 1981,
1987, Ishi 1982, Muramatsu 1983). Most emphasise structural inflexibili-
ties built into the Japanese public finance system, inflexibilitiesthat
were incompatible with rapid changes in private economic perfor-
mance. Three factors are commonly stressed.
First, many new social welfare programs had been built into the
fiscal system since 1973.2' Welfare expenditure increased by 20 to 40
percent annually throughout the 1970s, a higher level than in any other
postwar decade. This growth in social welfare expenditure was
propelled by the policy decision to increase social security benefits such
as health insurance and public pensions, a policy reflecting welfare
state ideals (Noguchi 1987, Muramatsu 1983).
Second, regional income redistribution via specific purpose grants
was fixed structurally and implemented through the general account of
the central government. In the 1960s and 1970s, specific purpose grants
as a share of the central government's general expenditure reached 45
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percent. These grants were in response to the endless accumulation of
funding requests from interest groups and voters/citizens, and
politicians' desires to fulfillthese in view of electoral considerations
(Muramatsu 1983).
Third, the income taxation scheme could not be relied upon to
meet growing financial needs. This was partly due to political
constraints against increasing tax revenue during an economic
slowdown, and partly due to inequalities inherent in the tax system
stemming from the difficulty of identifying all sources of taxable
income accruing to different classes of tax-payers.3'
Two strategies were initially pursued to tide the central govern-
ment over the fiscal crisis. First, the central government set strict
ceilings on budget growth and tried to restrict the size of the public
sector. Cabinet first put a ceiling on the central government's budget in
1961 in response to economic and financial conditions. A zero ceiling (in
1982) and minus ceiling (since 1983) were set to overcome the fiscal
crisis and restore healthy public finance. Second, a new consumption
tax was proposed in 1979. The proposed consumption tax became a
controversial issue in the lead-up to the 1979 Lower House election.
The ruling party fared disastrously, winning only 248 seats, compared
with more than 270 seats until the early 1970s. This poor general
election result for the ruling party because of its tax reform agenda
forced the government to take an alternative course, with the result
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that public sector expenditure was finallytargeted in the reform.
The commission met regularly during the early 1980s. Research
was carried out by organisations and individuals representing various
sectors of society,including business, trade unions, a public sector
union, the civilservice,the media and the academic world (Ito 1988).
The fundamental politico-economic objectives of the administrative
reform were presented in five reports published by the commission
{Gyoseikaikaku Taiko) and are summarised in the following three
points:
The rationalisation of the public sector was promoted through the
slogan 'fiscal consolidation without raising taxes' (zozeinaki zaiseisai-
ken). In intergovernmental financial relationships, specific purpose
grants were re-examined from the viewpoints of simplicity, efficiency
and reliability.
Policies to streamline the provision of specific purpose grants were
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proposed in billsconcerning the compilation of budgets submitted to
the Diet in 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986.4)Most of the billswere brought
up en bloc for discussion and were strongly opposed by the opposition
parties,thus delaying theirpassage through the Diet.
The billswere aimed at drasticrationalisationof both subsidy and
contribution rates in specific purpose grants provision (Nihonkeizai
Shinbun 3/12/84 and Chiho Jichi Shiryo 1/2/85).5'The content of the
billsincluded: reduction of specific purpose grants for welfare,
especiallyaffecting pensions, mutual benefit trusts,and poverty relief;
reduction of specificpurpose grants for education, both compulsory and
private;reorganisationof specificpurpose grants for public works and
construction; reduction of specific purpose grants to promote local
industry; and an across-the-board ten per cent cut for specificpurpose
grants with subsidy rates exceeding 50 percent.
The billstargeted two areas in particular.The first was local
public expenditure in a wide range of areas. The growth of democracy
in postwar Japan had establishedthe leadership of a range of interest
groups in promoting local projects,and thereby local public expendi-
ture,in line with the demands of voters/citizens(Muramatsu 1983).
The reform thus had to obtain a consensus on the rationalisationof
grants from a broad spectrum of interest groups including voters/citi-
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zens.
The second area targeted was specific purpose grants with high
subsidy rates (over 50 percent in the 1985 budget). There are several
reasons why specific purpose grants with high subsidy rates are likely
to cause inefficiencies in the management of public finance. Kato and
Hyodo (1988: 95), identify the following four. First, specific purpose
grants with high subsidy rates often destroy the incentive for the
grantee to manage finances efficiently,and grants are likely to result in
wasteful expenditure on expanded public activities. Second, high
subsidy rates should only be applied after comprehensive examination
of both national and local financial conditions, and local administrative
capacities. There had been a big change in the need for grants having
high subsidy rates compared with when these grants were first
provided. Third, high subsidy rates are not essential, particularly for
local bodies with a good financial performance. And finally,against a
background of national budgetary difficulties,maintaining high subsidy
rates limits the central government's options for carrying out its policy
schedule.
Statistical profile
The impact of the Second Administrative Reform on intergovernmental
grants provision can be examined statisticallyboth from a macro and a
micro viewpoint. First, at a macro level the reform resulted in the
substitution of other financial sources for specific purpose grants. Local
governments have three main sources of revenue: specific purpose
grants; local allocation tax; and local taxes. Figure 1 shows the
changes in the shares of these different categories of revenue sources
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for local governments during the postwar period.It demonstrates the
sharp reduction in the share of specificpurpose grants and the increase
in the shares of local taxes and local allocationtax that have occurred
since 1980. The share of local taxes in local financialrevenue had
increased to as much as 40 percent of totalrevenue in the late 1980s.
Since the administrativereform of the early 1980s, local governments
have steadilyraised a larger proportion of their own funds, becoming
increasingly more autonomous and efficientin the management of local
public finance and demonstrating increased financialaccountability.
Figure 1 Shares oflocaltax,specificpurposegrantsand local
allocationtaxin localgovernment revenue
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The impact of the administrative reform at a micro level is
revealed by focusing on categories of specific purpose grants. Specific
purpose grants fall into five categories, namely national treasury
grants-in-aid (kokko hojokin), national treasury obligatory shares (kokko
futankin), national treasury exceptional subsidy (kofukin), national
treasury supplementary compensation (hokyukin) and national treasury
delegation payment (kokko itakukin).
Table 3 shows how the funding of these different categories of
specific purpose grants has changed. The share of national treasury
grants-in-aid, which offer the most discretion for funding from the
Table 3 Changes in types of specificpurpose grants (＼ billion)
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centralgovernment, declined sharply from 67.8 percent in 1984 to 32.8
percent in 1988. To offset this,there was an increase in the national
treasury obligatoryshare, which is regulated by law, from 18.9 percent
in 1984 to 55.1 percent in 1988, demonstrating the increase in
institutionallysupported specific purpose grants. National treasury
grants-in-aid have, however, been partlyabsorbed into nationaltreasury
obligatory shares since 1987, after an adjustment of the accounting
method (Kato and Hyodo 1988).6)
Many smaller grants-in-aid are provided by the bureaucracy,
reflecting sectional disputes between ministries.Most of these are
non-statutory grants supporting the policyobjectivesof the bureaucracy
concerned, and the discretionof the central government in providing
them is easily obtained. Administrative and politicalintricacyin the
provisionof grants-in-aid had often been criticisedbecause it brought
about inefficienciesin intergovernmental financialrelationships(Hirose
1981).The reform, therefore,mainly concentrated on rationalisingminor
national treasury grants-in-aid.
The changing pattern of national treasury grants-in-aid can be
examined in two ways: according to the number of types; and by
calculatingthe effectivesubsidy rates of grants-in-aid.
Figure 2 shows the sharp reduction in the number of national
treasury grants-in-aidfrom 676 in 1975 to 485 in 1988. This reduction
was due in part to minor grants-in-aid being integrated with larger
ones, and also demonstrates that the rationalisationof minor national
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treasury grants-in-aid was actively promoted during the reform.
Figure 2 Number of nationaltreasury grants-in-aid
The effective subsidy rates of national treasury grants-in-aid have
been measured to calculate the magnitude of the reduction in high
subsidy rates as a result of the administrative reform. Grants-in-aid are
categorised according to types of local expenditure. Effective subsidy
rates for 1975-88 were calculated based on Hojokin soran (Statistics of
governmental grants in Japan) following Ishi et al.(1983). Methods used
in calculations and notations are explained in Appendix 1.
Figures 3(a) to 4 show the shift in effective subsidy rates in
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specificpurpose grants provision since 1975. Figure 3(a) shows changes
in the effective subsidy rates of aggregated local public expenditure.
There has been a sharp reduction in effective subsidy rates since 1983
indicating that the reform contributed to the rationalisationof specific
purpose grants at the aggregated level of local public expenditure.
Figure 3a Effectivesubsidyratesfor aggregatedlocal
expenditure,1975-88
Figures 3(b) and 3(c) show effective subsidy rates for different
categories of local public expenditure. A sharp reduction is apparent in
effective subsidy rates for social welfare and for local public expendi-
ture on national agential tasks (expenditure incurred on behalf of the
central government in such areas as national elections, the judiciary,
police, fire fighting, maintaining the Imperial Household, etc.),reflecting
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large cuts in subsidies for local welfare expenditures, particularly in the
areas of national health insurance and child care. The effective subsidy
rates for local expenditure on industry and the economy and on land
development and conservation also fell.However, the participation of
industry groups in the public choice process of the administrative reform
and political pressure from industry resulted in relatively high subsidy
rates for this category (consistently above 0.65 since 1975). There was
also a reduction in effective subsidy rates for local expenditure on
education and culture in the early 1980s, though expenditure in this
Figure 3b Effective subsidy rates forlocal expenditure on land development
and conservation,industry and economy, education and culture,and
socialwelfare (based on categorisation1),1975-88
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area has increased since 1986. The main cause of the reduction was
the rationalisation of financial aid for the construction of educational
facilitiesand management of private schools. The increase since 1986
seems to have been caused by the integration of subsidised education
programs. The subsidy rate for the financial management of local
public finance remained steady throughout the 1980s. This was because
expenditure in this area did not become an issue during the discussion
of administrative reform.
Figure 3c Effective subsidy rates for local public expenditure on national
agential tasks and the financialadjustment of local public finance
(based on categorisationI),1975-88
Figure 4 shows the changes in effective subsidy rates for local
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public expenditure, categorised by economic objective. Effective subsidy
rates for current purchases of goods and services, current subsidies,
transfers and capital expenditures on goods and services tended to
decrease throughout the 1980s. The extent of these cuts became
apparent around 1985, when the examination of programs was complete
and cuts finalised. The sharpest reductions were experienced in current
purchases of goods and services, and transfers.
Figure 4 Effective subsidy rates for current subsidies of and current local
expenditure on the purchase of goods and services,local expenditure
on capital goods and services, and local transfer expenditure (based
on category II),1975 to 1988
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Policy implications for local public finance
Both the central government and local governments have cooperated in
carrying out administrative reform in the 1980s. Their efforts have
resulted in improvements in the efficiency of the public sector and its
financial management, particularly with regard to rationalising specific
purpose grants and curtailing both national and local public expendi-
ture.
This section discusses the contribution local governments have
made in promoting administrative reform and examines the policy
implications of reform on the relationship between the central
government and local governments.
Local participation and cooperation in the accomplishment of reform
took place on several levels. The following are the most significant.
First,local governments were involved from the beginning in instituting
reform. All 47 prefectures and 98.2 percent of local municipalities
(3209 bodies) made submissions on how best to achieve administrative
reform {Chihojichi Shiryb 1/7/89). Their submissions contained a
common agenda in their concern for reviewing administrative and
financial relationships between the central government and local
governments, rationalisinglabour unions in the public sector, setting an
appropriate level of employment for the public service, improving the
efficiency of the public service, and adjusting public sector salary
awards. With regard to the rationalisation of specific purpose grants in
particular, it was to the advantage of local governments to promote
improvements in the efficiency of local public finance and increased
local discretionary funding such as local tax and local allocation tax.
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Second, the proposed content of the reform was discussed at a
number of meetings between local government and central government
officials(Ito 1988; Somucho Gyosei Kansatsukyoku 1987). The hearings
were a forum for practical dialogue between the central government
and local governments, providing local governments with advance
information and the central government with useful feedback. In
addition, the proposed content of reform and the timetable for its
implementation were made public (Chihojichi Keieigakkai 1985;
Somucho Gyosei Kansatsukyoku 1987).
From the viewpoint of local governments, the reform failed to deal
with crucial issues. Concentrating on policy issues such as the
rationalisation of specific purpose grants and the improvement of
efficiency in public finance, the reform did not touch on intrinsic issues
affecting the central-local relationship such as the decentralisation of
administrative and financial functions to local governments, and the
strengthening of local autonomy."
These problems were subsequently considered by three successive
Commissions for the Promotion of Administrative Reform. These
commissions looked closely at the problematic areas of the intergovern-
mental system and provided a long-term vision for future financial
relationships. Their recommendations included: (1) a re-examination of
the sharing of costs between the central and local governments, taking
into account the differing fiscal capacities of local governments; (2) the
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improvement and promotion of autonomous administrations in pivotal
local cities; and (3) the introduction of a highly decentralised financial
system along the lines of the federal system, and of a decentralised
regional bloc fiscal system (do shu sei).
These proposals have not yet been implemented. However, several
innovations were made in grants policies in the late 1980s. One was a
financial transfer, provided for in the national budget, to all local
governments. This was carried out under the Takeshita administration
in 1989, when alllocal governments, regardless of size, received a 100
million yen payout as an untied transfer, and was recommended again
in 1990. This transfer program gave local governments the opportunity
to realise their potential in making autonomous financial decisions.
The tax base of the local allocation tax was also expanded,
improving local discretionary funding. Two sources of tax revenues,
consumption tax revenue and tobacco tax revenue, were introduced to
secure funding for local allocation tax. The revenue collected through
local allocation tax thus increased by 20 percent in 1989 compared
with the year before. This increase made up for the reduction in
sources of finance caused by cuts in specific purpose grants and
contributed to the improvement of local government discretion over
finances.
Conclusion
According to Ito (1988), the administrative reform of the 1980s, when
viewed from a broader historical perspective, can be said to have had
two goals. The first,short-term goal was to restore financial balance in
the central government and reduce public sector deficits by eliminating
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inefficiencies in public expenditure and the specific purpose grants
system. The second, long-term goal was to bring forth a new system
of public policy formulation, based on a restructured and healthier
central-local relationship in the areas of public finance management and
public sector administration.
The reform restricted the growth of the budget and held down
deficits at the central government level through its rationalisation of
specific purpose grants. The efficiency of public sector management
was also enhanced, without corresponding increases in taxes.
The evidence confirms that the reform was successful in the first
area identified by Ito. There was indeed a shift in the composition of
intergovernmental grants, away from specific purpose grants and
towards local allocation tax and local taxes; local government discretion
in public finance was strengthened as a result. Administrative
efficiency in intergovernmental financial relationships was enhanced by
the consolidation of smaller specific purpose grants.
At the same time, specific purpose grants for social welfare and
land development and conservation - areas excessively subsidised
through national treasury grants-in-aid - were drastically reduced. Both
the central government and local governments recognised that the
rationalisation of specific purpose grants was necessary to get rid of
central government budget inflexibility and to improve the financial
accountability of local governments.
The reform was less successful in its second goal. Fundamental
issues in long-term central-local relationships - decentralisation of
administrative and financial functions to local governments and the
strengthening of local autonomy, for example - made little headway.
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The reformers recognised the need to examine further the feasibilityof
proposals for long-term reform; councils set up after the reform
continued to debate these for some years, and innovations began to be
seen in the late 1980s.
Local participationwas a feature of the administrative reform's
public choice process. Local decision-making bodies such as local
bureaucracies,local interest groups and the electorate,were able to
express their views through the submission of requests, setting up
local advisory bodies and holding local hearings to publiciseproblems.
The resolutionof difficultiesresultingfrom the reform and the reform's
smooth implementation were in large part due to successful coordina-
tion between these decision-making bodies.
Appendix 1 Method of calculating effective subsidy rates
Effective subsidy rates are calculated on the basis of data provided in
Hojokin soran (Statisticsof governmental grants in Japan). Due to the
diversifiedchannels for intergovernmental grants provision in the
general account, effective subsidy rates have to be estimated by
putting them into categories,based on several accounting focuses. Ishi
(1985) and Ishi et al.(1983) initiatedcalculationof effective subsidy
rates. Extending their approach by incorporating different categories
and consideringlonger time periods would be of use to an understand-
ing of historicalchanges in effectivesubsidy rates.
Eleven digit number codes are given in the general account for
different channels of national treasury grants-in-aid provision,
distinguished according to the type, objective,economic function,etc.,
of the subsidised local public expenditure. Categories of national
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Category 1: Expenditure objectives(1975, 1980-88)
Category 2: Economic functions(1980-88)
treasury grants-in-aid and local public expenditure can be sorted using
these number codes. I employed two categorisations for national
treasury grants-in-aid, based on: the objective of the subsidised local
public expenditure (category 1) and the economic function of the
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subsidised local public expenditure (category 2).I added the amount of
national treasury grants-in-aid and the amount of local public
expenditure in each category, and obtained the effective subsidy rate
by simply dividing the former by the latter.
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